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QUERYING EDITH WINDSOR, QUERYING EQUALITY 
JEFFREY A. REDDING* 
N this short essay, I want to sound some skepticism about U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion in United States v. 
Windsor,1 and especially the vision of equality articulated by it.  I will assume 
that the reader of this essay has read Windsor and is otherwise familiar with the 
essential facts of this case concerning the constitutionality of Section 3 of the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).2  I will not assume a familiarity, however, 
with the factors that propel my skepticism towards Kennedy’s opinion, two of 
which I will detail from the outset. 
The first such factor revolves around the real and profound divisions within 
the LGBTQ “community,” both domestically and internationally.  These 
divisions concern a number of debates including (but not limited to) the 
“nature” of sexuality and gender—for example, are gender and sexuality innate 
or socially constructed?; if they are socially constructed, can they be 
changed?—but also the character of the American state—for example, is it 
fundamentally fair or is it mostly in the service of predatory power?  Ultimately, 
as we will see, these intra-LGBTQ divisions, some of which seem zero-sum, 
help propel skepticism towards any vision of equality, such as that articulated in 
Windsor, which claims to speak for or help everyone. 
The second such factor derives from a view of equality, which sees this 
idea as a socially contextual and politically constructed one.  In other words, 
equality does not mean the same thing for all people everywhere, whether in the 
United States or elsewhere.  Moreover, equality’s meaning and implications 
emerge through dynamic social and political processes, which court cases 
contribute to (and react against).  Furthermore, as prominent participants in 
these social and political processes surrounding equality, the various 
protagonists—for example, plaintiffs, defendants, amici, and judges—of legal 
dramas concerning equality all contribute to the shape of it.  As a result, we will 
also see in this essay how especially dubious plaintiff-protagonists can give rise 
to especially dubious articulations of equality. 
This essay, then, discusses one such dubious plaintiff-protagonist, Edith 
Windsor, as well as the dubious shape of equality that emerges from her 
eponymous Supreme Court case.  In expressing skepticism vis-à-vis the 
 
 *  Associate Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.  This short essay is an 
expansion and refinement of a previous set of thoughts that I offered on the Windsor litigation 
for The Faculty Lounge blog (http://www.thefacultylounge.org).  I would like to thank the 
(mostly anonymous) commentators there for their questions and critiques, as well as Seval 
Yildirim for not only facilitating this essay but also her comradeship more generally.  Leslie 
Dunlap and Heather Slawson provided very helpful research assistance for this essay.  Finally, 
this essay is dedicated to Ryan Conrad and Yasmin Nair, because the world would be much 
more flat and equal without their disruptions. 
1.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
2.  See generally Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 
(1996).   
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articulation of equality that results from Windsor, the suggestion, however, is 
not that everyone fares equally poorly after it.  Rather, some people will do 
quite well after this case, while others will not.  And, indeed, that is one of the 
essential takeaways in highlighting, from the outset, the social and political 
character of ideas like equality: with equality, as in society and in politics, some 
people win and some people lose (if not always permanently). 
As to winners, if there was one real person who really benefited from 
United States v. Windsor, it would have to be Edith Windsor herself—to the 
tune of the $363,053 that the Supreme Court awarded her when it determined 
that she, as a married person, should not have had to pay the federal estate taxes 
that the IRS demanded from her as a result of DOMA.  As to losers, the 
defendant United States was not the most salient one here.  Rather, as I see it, it 
was queer people, as well as the possibility of an American legal system that 
respects them. 
How can a win for same-sex marriage hurt queer people?  Didn’t the U.S. 
Supreme Court strike a progressive vision for society and politics in striking 
down a hateful DOMA?  In beginning to answer these questions, it is worth 
remembering (and stating again) that the LGBTQ community is neither 
monolithic nor one without its own serious internal conflicts.  And in these 
internal conflicts, poorer T and Q voices often get drowned out by hyper-funded 
LGB groups such as Human Rights Campaign, Freedom to Marry, and Lambda 
Legal.  Yet, despite all their resources, and the sophisticated thinking that those 
resources could muster, these organizations (and others) commonly make 
highly simplistic and highly regressive arguments for same-sex marriage rights.  
These kinds of arguments were made in the course of litigating Windsor, and 
they were largely accepted by the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in this 
case.  As a result, there are many reasons to be skeptical that Windsor actually 
advanced progressivism or the welfare and interests of queer people. 
By way of example, much (mainstream LGB) “liberal” argumentation for 
same-sex marriage has followed conservative argumentation about marriage in 
stressing a connection between marriage and children’s welfare.  And indeed, in 
his majority opinion in Windsor, Justice Kennedy stressed how so-called 
“second-tier [DOMA-disadvantaged] marriage. . . .  [M]akes it even more 
difficult for the children [of these relationships] to understand the integrity and 
closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their 
community and in their daily lives.”3  At one level, this kind of statement is 
almost comedic, assuming as it does that children are pre-programmed robots 
whose Microsoft engineers forgot to include the expression “domestic partner” 
in their factory-loaded spell checks.  At another level, however, such a 
statement is frightening in its implicit disregard for (family) diversity and the 
importance of teaching tolerance and an understanding of difference to children.  
To my ear then, this kind of “marriage equality” rhetoric does not strike a blow 
for either social progressivism or those who are especially socially marginalized 
(e.g., Ts and Qs). 
 
3.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.  
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While I am skeptical of mainstream LGB groups’ mode of argumentation 
for same-sex marriage in the United States—as well as that of the judges and 
Justices who agree with these groups—I should emphasize that I am not 
irrevocably opposed to same-sex marriage itself.  As I have argued elsewhere,4 
the problem with pro-same-sex marriage argumentation in the contemporary 
United States is not “marriage” per se—nor “same-sex”!—but the kinds of 
regressive and hegemonic arguments made in this debate emphasizing the 
alleged importance of marriage for everyone, everywhere, and for all time. 
In contrast to these mainstream LGB organizations’ homogeneous vision 
for the nation, it is worth highlighting that different American states have 
different overall political compositions, different LGBTQ communities, and 
different histories of marriage, as well as the rights and disabilities legally 
attendant to marriage.  As a result, there are real worries—especially in highly 
conservative, marriage-idealizing, divorce-hating, polyamory-penalizing 
states—that members of minority sexualities could be entrapped by the 
majoritarian politics of a given state’s marriage system if other, alternative 
formal relationships (e.g., domestic partnerships and civil unions) are not 
available to these minorities.  Consequently, in advocating marriage for 
everyone, mainstream LGB groups are leading us towards a system of pan-
continental, marital mediocrity (or worse) in how we formally recognize and 
define relationships. 
Given this view of things, one might say then that the problem with 
Windsor is not that it is a same-sex marriage-affirming opinion, but that it is a 
Human Rights Campaign et al. argued and a conservative Justice Kennedy 
authored marriage-affirming opinion.  As a result, we have an opinion that is 
not only, first and foremost, a win for Edith Windsor, but also for the elite 
interests which fund the Human Rights Campaign and its allied organizations.  
Indeed, one can only imagine how the “injury” which sparked Edith Windsor’s 
case—namely having to pay the federal estate tax—is also a grievous injury for 
many of the patron saints of LGB organizations like the Human Rights 
Campaign. 
Hopefully, one can now at least begin to see how it might be that not all 
human lives will benefit from the “equality” that United States v. Windsor 
deigns some.  For a moment though, I want to go further than that relatively 
cautious statement and, via a brief detour, also suggest that the majority opinion 
in Windsor is not only not very beneficial (for many), but that elements of it 
border on dangerous (for many).  To see this danger, one has to know a bit 
about the precedential backdrop of this case, which includes the important 2003 
precedent of Lawrence v. Texas5 concerning the constitutionality of Texas’s 
sodomy criminalization.  Justice Kennedy also authored the majority opinion in 
Lawrence and, unsurprisingly, cites to it in the Windsor opinion.6  And herein 
 
4.  See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Redding, Proposition 8 and the Future of American Same-Sex 
Marriage Activism, 14 NEXUS 113 (2009); Jeffrey A. Redding, Dignity, Legal Pluralism, 
and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 791 (2010). 
5.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
6.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690. 
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lies a major danger of Windsor. 
Others before have noted how Kennedy, in Lawrence, transformed and 
sanitized the right to anal and oral sex presumably at issue in that case into a 
right to create “element[s] in a personal bond that is more enduring.”7  In short, 
such a read on Lawrence has skeptically viewed Kennedy’s majority opinion in 
this case as not primarily concerned with a right to sexual play, frivolity, or 
momentary desire but, instead, very much a pre-opinion about the right to 
sexual seriousness, loyalty, and servitude—or, to put it more bluntly, that 
Kennedy’s Lawrence opinion is not about the right to do something like 
Manhunt,8 but rather the right to do something like majoritarian marriage.9 
In Windsor then, Kennedy appears to confirm this interpretation of the 
“personal bond” language from Lawrence, noting how New York, in 
“authorizing same-sex unions and same-sex marriages . . . sought to give further 
protection and dignity to that [Lawrencian] bond.”10  Put another way, after 
Windsor, Lawrence seems more and more now a case concerning the right to 
get engaged, while Windsor is about the right to marriage (and estate tax 
avoidance) proper.  On this view of things then, it appears that after United 
States v. Windsor, Edith Windsor got a tax deduction, while the rest of us (or, at 
least, those of us who are sexually active) got a dangerous rights reduction.  
Equality then may not only be unequal in its implications, but it may come, 
dangerously, at the expense of important liberties—at least in the allegedly 
progressive world that Justice Kennedy is making out for us. 
Yet some readers here will surely protest that Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Windsor ultimately relied on the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth 
Amendment—and its protection of liberty—to invalidate Section 3 of 
DOMA.11  How then can this not be an opinion just as much about liberty as it 
is equality? 
It may be.  But if Justice Kennedy’s opinion is just as much about liberty as 
it is equality,12 it is worth observing that there are just as many reasons to be 
skeptical of Justice Kennedy’s understanding of liberty as there are to be 
skeptical of his understanding of equality.  At the very least, Kennedy’s 
understanding of liberty appears to rely on a peculiar notion of dignity, which 
DOMA’s Section 3 purportedly demeaned.13  However, many of the examples 
 
7.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567; see also Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated 
Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004); Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights 
Versus Queer Theory: What is Left of Sodomy After Lawrence v. Texas?, 23 SOC. TEXT 235 
(2005). 
8.  A social networking site that facilitates male same-sex introductions.   
9.  This is despite Kennedy’s protestations, in Lawrence, that this case was in no way a 
precedent about the right to same-sex marriage.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.   
10.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. 
11.  See id. at 2697. 
12.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion is quite confusing in its easy conflation of liberty, 
dignity, and equality, noting as it does that “[w]hile the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws 
from Government the power to degrade or demean in the way [DOMA] does, the equal 
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment right all the 
more specific and all the better understood and preserved.”  Id. 
13.  See id. 
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 6 [2015], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol59/iss6/2
2013] QUERYING EDITH WINDSOR 13	  
of this DOMA-dignity-demeaning that Justice Kennedy provides sound more 
like cut-and-paste clichés rather than soundly reasoned or evidenced examples 
of how LGBTQ dignity is demeaned by this contentious federal statute. 
For example, and going to the heart of the facts underlying Windsor, that 
Edith Windsor had to pay substantial (for the United States) federal taxes on the 
estate she inherited does not sound much like a dignity issue per se.  However, I 
imagine that some readers may fault me for failing to see the connection 
between asking “unmarried” gay people to pay estate taxes while letting 
married straight people avoid such reasonable taxes—which, lest we forget, are 
also progressive in both the social and economic sense of this word—and 
dignity (or is it liberty, or equality, or all three?). 
Other examples that Justice Kennedy provides of DOMA’s alleged 
indignities14 are equally problematic and unconvincing, if not also incoherent.  
As to this incoherency, Kennedy laments in his opinion how “[u]nder DOMA, 
same-sex married couples have their lives burdened, by reason of government 
decree, in visible and public ways.”15  Yet very soon thereafter, we see 
Kennedy lamenting how DOMA “divests married same-sex couples of the 
duties and responsibilities that are an essential part of married life.”16  One 
might very well wonder then whether, with DOMA, same-sex married couples 
experience more, or fewer, burdens?  Moreover, examples which Kennedy 
provides of his so-called essentialities (of married life), and which DOMA 
allegedly divests same-sex married couples of, include being bound by 
prohibitions—as a recognized “spouse” of a Senator—from accepting “high-
value gifts from certain sources”17 and also—as a recognized “spouse” of any 
one of “numerous high-ranking officials”18—from being required to make 
extensive and burdensome official filings as to one’s financial situation. 
If these examples of DOMA’s indignities are unconvincing—which they 
seem to be—Justice Kennedy assures us that “[f]or certain married couples, 
DOMA’s unequal effects are even more serious.”19  He then goes on to note 
how same-sex spouses, because of DOMA, are not comprehended by Title 18, 
Section 115(a)(1) of the United States Code, the part of the federal code making 
it a crime to “assault[], kidnap[], or murder[] . . . a member of the immediate 
family of a United States official . . . with intent to impede, intimidate, or 
interfere with such official . . . while engaged in the performance of official 
duties.”20 
Imagine, however, that Edith Windsor had not been a mathematician 
heiress in her lifetime but, rather, had served as a United States civil servant.  
Imagine as well that Edith Windsor’s spouse, Thea Spyer, had been criminally 
 
14.  I use this word following Kennedy’s observation that “this Court [must] now . . . 
address whether the resulting injury and indignity [of DOMA] is a deprivation of an essential 
part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment.”  Id. at 2692 (emphasis added). 
15.  Id. at 2694 (emphasis added). 
16.  Id. at 2695 (emphasis added). 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. at 2694. 
20.  18 U.S.C.A. § 115(a)(1) (West 2008). 
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targeted in an attempt to influence U.S. Officer Windsor’s official actions yet, 
because of DOMA, Thea Spyer’s attacker had not been prosecuted under 
Section 115(a)(1).  Would Edith Windsor have been a sympathetic, dignity-
demeaned plaintiff in this instance, much less a coherent one? 
My skeptical response is: No, not really.  For one, it is far from clear that 
the aggrieved party here would be Edith Windsor, rather than the U.S. 
government, whose decisions and actions were arguably the real target of the 
criminal activity perpetrated against (a hypothetical) Thea Spyer.  More 
fundamentally, however, Kennedy’s opinion here traffics in the false premise 
that all or most queer people have faith in the fairness of the American criminal-
prosecution system and—where that underlying fairness is lacking—this 
system’s desire to prosecute any harm in exponential (and increasingly unfair) 
ways.21 
In other words, even assuming that our hypothetical Thea Spyer has an 
interest in criminally prosecuting her victimization—I assume that, in several 
instances, she would—it is far from clear that either she or Edith has an 
independent “dignity” interest in seeing Thea’s victimization prosecuted at the 
federal level under Section 115(a)(1).  Indeed, Thea may view the prospect of 
sending any person found guilty of her attack to spend their life in a federal 
penitentiary a grievous assault itself on human dignity.  As to our hypothetical 
Edith, she would not be Thea’s owner and, even if she were, our hypothetical 
Edith may also find the prospect of activating the federal criminal-prosecution 
system horrifying. 
Such a reaction to the state is not one that mainstream LGB organizations, 
much less members of the U.S. government (e.g., Supreme Court Justice 
Anthony Kennedy), are generally comfortable with.  Yet in veering away from 
these very human reactions to the state, I fear that these LGB organizations, and 
Justice Kennedy, stray into both logical and moral incoherency. 
By way of concluding, let me note that the “horror” towards the state 
which I am making out here is a volatile—although all too human—emotion.  I 
mention this because, to my mind, not only United States v. Windsor, but so 
many “marriage equality” cases over the years have been devoid of vivid and 
human emotionality.  Indeed, instead of talking about relationships as 
complicated, fun, and wrenching messes of sex, power, and all-too-common 
failure, we see them analyzed in mainstream (liberal) legal circles as 
repositories of plug-and-chug ideals of liberty, equality, and dignity. 
In many ways, the robotic (affect of the) values which are being articulated 
in these cases is, I suspect, the consequence of the particular plaintiffs and 
issues which mainstream LGB organizations are recruiting for and representing 
in these marriage equality cases.  This is not to say that Edith Windsor is a 
robot, but it is to say that mainstream LGB organizations were likely attracted 
to her as a plaintiff because of the ease in which her federal estate tax issues 
could be fit within the two-dimensional, cartoonish idea of equality—“straight 
 
21.  Such queer concerns have, in fact, motivated the latest edited collection by the 
group Against Equality.  See generally AGAINST EQUALITY: PRISONS WILL NOT PROTECT 
YOU (Ryan Conrad ed., 2012). 
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people get to do this, gay people should too”—that these mainstream 
organizations are making out and which judges and Justices are agreeing to. 
Is there a way out of this reductive sterility?  In other words, is there a way 
to get courts to talk about equality in a way more attuned to the complexity of 
this idea in the real world, as well as the complexity of the LGBTQ community?  
Once upon a time, courts understood democracy as involving much more than 
simple majoritarianism; is it possible to now get them to understand equality as 
something more than just a mean formality? 
Put another way altogether, is there a way to conjure a queer Edith 
Windsor, in the hope that this kind of plaintiff will allow for a more human(e) 
articulation of equality to emerge from American courts and their resolutions of 
various same-sex marriage controversies?  In posing the question this way, let 
me first note that Edith Windsor was “queer” in one important way, namely that 
she was in a childless marriage.  As a result, it was arguably harder for Justice 
Kennedy to make Windsor all about children.22  But I believe that one can dig 
even deeper into this opinion to find our queer Edith. 
And indeed, six feet under the surface of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, there 
might be something.  In a somewhat throwaway example, Kennedy mentions 
how DOMA prevents same-sex couples “from being buried together in 
veterans’ cemeteries.”23  Might there be something queer in this necropolitics?  
Put another way, might Justice Kennedy’s opinion here open up a politics of 
marriage that does not reduce it to reproduction, nation-building, and a forever 
happiness? 
While I read Windsor with much caution and skepticism, let me conclude 
this essay by very briefly suggesting two ways in which Justice Kennedy’s 
invocation of the veterans cemetery could possibly (and totally unintentionally) 
open up a queer politics of marriage (equality) in the United States. 
The first way derives from viewing the cemetery as a repository of death.  
This death reference in an opinion about marriage is noteworthy because Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion, read more generally, is all about celebrating marriage as 
life24 and, in particular, the kind of dignified life presumably worth living.  
Moreover, if marriage equals life, then presumably divorce equals death.  
Perhaps then, if marriage equality could be fundamentally about divorce 
equality—in other words, if our next Edith Windsor could be a divorcée, 
perhaps claiming Social Security benefits due her as an ex-spouse25—we might 
find an escape from an all-too-blinding rhetoric about marriage and all the good 
it brings everyone, everywhere.  While some might see the prospect of this kind 
of plaintiff-protagonist as unrealistic, it is worth noting that divorce rights are 
integral to future arguments about the surviving section of DOMA, namely 
Section 2, and the way certain states have used this section to justify their 
 
22.  See supra note 3 and text accompanying, however, for how some of Kennedy’s 
observations about children were nonetheless quite simplistic. 
23.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
24.  This in the context of a situation where one of the marital spouses relevant to the 
case, namely Thea Spyer, had died. 
25.  See generally Retirement Planner: If You Are Divorced, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/retire2/divspouse.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2013). 
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refusal to issue divorces for other states’ same-sex marriages as a consequence 
of these states’ a priori refusal to recognize these other states’ same-sex 
marriages in the first instance.26 
The second way derives from thinking about the deadly wars which have 
caused those veterans cemeteries in the United States, that Justice Kennedy 
references, to greatly grow in size over the past decade.  Many have wondered 
how it might be possible to abate the seemingly constant cravings of the U.S. 
government for war.  International and domestic law penalizing acts of 
aggression against foreign states and their citizens do not seem to work in 
deterring American governmental officials from war-making.  What might 
work, however, in this domain—and what might actually be working in the 
aftermath of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 2008 economic meltdown—is financial 
starvation of the federal government, whether that happens through financial 
crisis or financial exhaustion.  Another way of imagining Edith Windsor, then, 
might be to see her (queerly) not only as an heiress avoiding federal estate 
taxes, but also as a conscientious tax evader, using marriage to make it harder 
for the U.S. government to make war against our global peers. 
That being said, such queer Edith Windsors, nor such queer articulations of 
equality, are ones that United States v. Windsor easily offers up.  I thus remain 
skeptical. 
 
 
26.  The text of this (surviving) section of DOMA reads:  
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be 
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other 
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the 
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.   
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
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